By Don Drinnon, 2021
With a lot of help from Tom McInerney, Jim Kobriger and Wikipedia
Background: Operation Igloo White was a covert United States joint military electronic warfare operation conducted from late January 1968 until February 1973 during the Vietnam War. That is the opening sentence from Wikipedia in their discussion of Operation Igloo White. I’ll remove all the background concerning the efforts dating back to 1966 that were initiated by then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, but Operation Igloo White became known to some of the guys in the field as “McNamara’s Fence”.
A part of the Operation was to deploy electronic sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and South Vietnam and other strategic areas that were to detect the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) movement of troops and their logistic support elements. The sensors would relay their data to the second element of the system, an orbiting EC-121R aircraft of the Air Force’s 553rd Reconnaissance Wing, based at Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base. The EC-121s would then relay the collected information via a radio link to Task Force Alpha at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base (NKP). At Task Force Alpha, the last of the three components in the system, the intelligence data (from a variety of sources, not just the sensors) would be entered, collated, retrieved, and stored by 2 computers. The computers were programmed to analyze the sensor data and compile intelligence information and then make predictions as to where and when a particular PAVN truck convoy would be geographically located for future targeting. This means that the real time data of troop and supply movements were used to develop reports and predictions rather than passing the information to the operational troops or aircrews for immediate real time action. You may now see where this story is going.
Some of these sensors were deployed by F-4D Phantoms of the 25th TFS stationed at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base. We, in the 469th, were quite familiar with the 25th squadron and its personnel as they had deployed in May of 1968 to Ubon from Eglin AFB and we had shared a building with them, the 25th being on the first floor and the 40th on the second floor. While at Eglin, the 25th aircrews were training for the unique mission of deploying the sensors associated with Igloo White. Because of the security of Igloo White, we in the 40th/469th knew only the basics of what they were doing.
The system as it relates to this story is:
- The 25th TFS would deploy the sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
- The sensors would relay PAVN movement information to the orbiting EC-121s.
- The EC-121s were stationed out of Korat and had the call sign Batcat.
- The Batcat aircraft would relay the information to Task Force Alpha at NKP.
- NKP would publish a report.
- At some point in the future, weapons were deployed where the targets were predicted to be.
- Minimal BDA (bomb damage assessment).
Now the story: Former Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld died on 29 June 2021 and, when I read of his death, I initially confused him with McNamara which made me think of “McNamara’s Fence” and Igloo White. I then recalled that some of the crews in the 469th had some missions related to Igloo White during our time at Korat. That is all I remembered other than since the Batcat aircraft were also at Korat, we somehow started getting the real time data from the Igloo White sensors via the Batcat crews and were able to use that data to attack real time targets. These were all night missions as the PAVN only moved equipment along the Ho Chi Minh trail under the cover of darkness. I thought that Tom McInerney was involved so I sent him the email below.
Tom had not been in the 40th with us at Eglin but had been heavily involved in the Cat III testing of the F-4E at Nellis AFB, NV and the portion of the testing that we did at Eglin. He joined the 469th at Korat in January 1969.
Dear Tom,
I hope this note finds you well.
When I saw that Rumsfeld died, I confused him with McNamara and that lead to my thoughts about Igloo White. That is why I am writing.
We from Eglin had some understanding about Igloo White since we were housed in the same building as the 25th TFS, the F-4D squadron that was trained and equipped to deploy the sensors to support Igloo White. As you recall, we also shared space with the 25th when we spent the month of February 1969 in Ubon.
Here comes my question. As I recall, you took the initiative to coordinate with the powers that be to set up a system that would allow a few of our crews to receive real time sensor data from the Batcat aircraft to identify active strings of sensors. This then allowed a real time attack by 469th F-4Es on the targets rather than after a few days of studying the data and predicting where the targets would be.
Is it true that you were the guy in the squadron that led that effort?
I found no mention of this effort in the Igloo White article in Wikipedia. The article seems good to me.
If you were the guy, would you give me a short paragraph about the effort? It would be great to include it in the history of the 469th TFS that I am pulling together.
Thanks much for your time.
Stay safe,
Don
Tom’s reply follows. I made a few very minor additions to help the reader with some of the fighter pilot talk:
DON
YES, WHAT YOU SAY IS TRUE EXCEPT I DO NOT KNOW IF I WAS THE GUY.
AS I REMEMBER IT, SOME OF THE GUYS WERE IN THE CLUB WITH THE BATCAT GUYS AND THEY WERE TELLING US WHAT THEY WERE DOING AND I THINK WE WERE ON THE NIGHT ONLY FRAG (Operation Order) THEN SO THE GUYS CAME TO ME AND I SAID LET’S WORK WITH THEM BUT DO NOT TELL 7TH AF OR THE WING.
I THINK I WAS THE FIRST 2 SHIP THAT HAD THEIR FREQ WHICH KOBRIGER, MY WSO/GIB HAD GOTTEN FROM THEM, AND WE CHECKED IN WITH THEM ON OUR SECONDARY RECEIVE ONLY RADIO FREQ WHEN WE GOT CLEARED IN BY ABCCC (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center) (I FORGET THE CALL SIGN) BUT WE KNEW THE BATCAT CALL SIGN AND FREQ AND THEY WOULD START TALKING TO US ON RECEIVE ONLY.
THEY STARTED FEEDING US MOVERS (truck activity) FROM THE CHECK POINTS (LIMA NUMBERS AS I RECALL) AND WE PUT IN OUR INS (Inertial Navigation System) AND THEN WOULD DROP FLARES OVER THE CHECK POINTS AND WOW DID WE GET THE BDA. (We had made maps of the locations of all the strings of sensors and had coordinated with the Batcat guys the numbering and locations of each string to aid in our quickly flying to the target area.)
WE WERE IN FACT GETTING RT/NRT (Real Time/Near Real Time) INFO UNBEKNOWNST TO THE ABCCC AND IGLOO WHITE WHICH WE KEPT HUSH HUSH BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE SCREWED IT UP. IN ADDITION, WE DID NOT TELL WING INTEL AT THE DEBRIEFS WHY WE DROPPED AT THOSE POINTS. AS YOU REMEMBER WE DID ROUTE RECCE W/O FACS (Forward Air Controllers) ON OUR OWN SO WE HAD PLENTY OF FLEXIBILITY.
I CAN NOT REMEMBER IF IT WAS D FLIGHT OR THE WHOLE SQN THAT WAS ON THE NIGHT FRAG AT THAT TIME BUT IT WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL AND WE NEVER ADVERTISED IT BECAUSE HIGHER UPS WOULD NOT GIVE US THAT FLEXIBILITY!!! I DO NOT THINK WE EVEN TOLD ED HILLDING (the Squadron Commander) OR THE OPS OFFICER BUT GORDIE EELLS KNEW AS I RECALL. GORDIE WAS D FLIGHT.
THAT IS WHAT I REMEMBER DON
JIM KOBRIGER WOULD PROBABLY HAVE A BETTER RECOLLECTION.
TOM
I then asked Tom a clarification about the receive only radio.
Tom,
And another question.
In your writeup, you mentioned using the receive only radio. Are you talking about the one that we normally had set to the Guard (emergency) Frequency? If so, what a clever idea. The Batcat could talk to you and give you real time data while you were still doing your thing on the main radio.
Don
Tom’s response completed the quest for the story of Igloo White and the 469th involvement at Korat.
DON
EXACTLY!
THEY WOULD TALK US INTO THE TARGET AREA LIKE A GCA AND WE WOULD POP FLARES AND THE TARGET WOULD BE DOWN BELOW!
I THINK WE WOULD CHANGE OUR IFF FOR MORE TARGETS BUT NORMALLY WE WOULD WINCHESTER (out of ordnance) BECAUSE THOSE CONVOYS WERE FAIRLY LONG.
DIVE TOSS WITH THE CBU 24s WAS A GREAT WEAPONS LOAD.
TOM
That is the story of the 469th TFS involvement with the Operation Igloo White in 1969. I don’t know if there was any involvement by the crews who replaced us as our one-year tours ended. A few guys, all back-seaters, sitting in the bar one evening started talking with their comrades from a different squadron and totally different mission and developed a plan to increase the effectiveness of the Tactical Air Power fighting the war in Vietnam. One of them, Jim Kobriger, took the plan to his front seater, Tom McInerney, and the plan was implemented with great results. Well Done!
